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Summary: This paper shows the dynamic effects of the reform of the Spanish
social security pension system on the pensions received by one of the most
vulnerable groups of the population, namely, widows. We undertake a duration 
analysis to account for the effects of reform over time. We study the effects on
the widows’ overall financial welfare in terms of the evolution of their risk of
poverty. We show that the combined effects of the measures to be imple-
mented will have a positive impact; that is to say, the risk of poverty diminishes
with respect to the current financial situation of the widows. However, the risk
of poverty increases as the pensioners get older.
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The reform of the pension systems in the European Union, provoked by the esti-
mated effects of the ageing population on the financial imbalances of the systems 
has again become a priority on the political agendas of the various countries. These 
reforms will have positive effects on future fiscal imbalances because the imple-
mented measures are intended to constrain the rate of growth of pension expendi-
ture, but they will have also have an effect on the overall financial welfare of the 
retired population.  
The effects that these reforms may have on the welfare of future generations 
of pensioners have not yet been widely studied (Barbara A. Butrica, Smith E. Karen, 
and Eugene C. Steuerle 2006; Holly Sutherland et al. 2006; Marie-Eve Lachance 
2008; Frédéric Gonand and Florence Legros 2009; Patricia Peinado and Felipe 
Serrano 2012). These studies demonstrate that the implemented or planned reforms 
in the various European countries and in the USA could have different effects on the 
welfare system, depending on which various combinations of the parameters are 
chosen (eligibility conditions, retirement age and indexation of the pension benefit). 
The scope of the present paper is to test the effects of the recent Spanish wel-
fare reform on one of the most vulnerable groups in the population: the recipients of 
widow pensions. In order to do so, the parametric reforms recently passed by the 
Spanish Parliament are taken as a case study.  
The features of the widow pensions are very similar to those of the vast ma-
jority of developed countries (Steven H. Sandell and Howard M. Iams 1997; Choi  
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Jongkyun 2006; Nadia Karamcheva and Alicia Munell 2007)
1. The two most char-
acteristic features that are highlighted in every study are as follows: the high con-
centration of women who received this benefit, and the higher probability that these 
recipients would find themselves in a state of poverty relative to retired men who 
received a retirement pension in Spain. In Spain, according to the Spanish Continu-
ous Survey of Working Lives (2007), 95.5% of widow pensions paid by the Spanish 
social security system are received by women (widow pensions). This has to do with 
the predominant social and family pattern of the past decades, which is character-
ized by the weak (and irregular) entrance of women into the workforce. In 2009, 
only 35.6% of retirement pensions were drawn by women, and their average pen-
sion was equal to only 59% of men’s pensions. Additionally, women’s life expec-
tancy is higher than that of men (both before and after the legal retirement age). 
With respect to the risk of poverty, the Spanish Survey of Life Conditions 
(ECV 2007) indicates that risk among Spanish men who receive a pension benefit 
(widowhood or other pension) is 29% while this rate reaches 33% for women. In the 
case of widows and widowers who live alone, the risk of falling into poverty is 
28.4% for men and 36.2% for women. At almost 8 points higher than the rate for 
men, this rate represents one of the highest risks of poverty registered in the EU 
(Ahn Namkee and Florentino Felgueroso 2007). The risk of poverty for men who do 
not live alone is practically equal for men and women (9.4% and 9.3%, respec-
tively).  
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the effects of the reform, which was 
passed by the Spanish parliament in August 2011, on the future welfare of the peo-
ple who are owed a widow pension. Welfare is analysed by means of the poverty 
risk associated with the widow’s pension.  
As we will note in the following study, poverty rates cannot be related exclu-
sively to the income stemming from pensions. However, in Spain a unique situation 
makes poverty risk particularly sensitive to the pension benefit, as a household’s 
greatest source of wealth is held in the form of home ownership. After Singapore 
Spain is the country with the highest rate of home ownership in the world. More 
than 80 per cent of Spanish households own the house in which they live. Holding 
investments in this way increase the sensitivity of the effects of the reforms on the 
welfare of the retired population for two different reasons. On one hand, the ageing 
process of the population has a negative effect on the value of housing (Elôd Takáts 
2010), ending in a loss of accumulated wealth. On the other hand, it is difficult to 
convert this asset into income, as has been shown by the poor development of finan-
cial products designed to achieve this objective (home-equity reversion). As a con-
sequence, the changes in the widow pension may have a deeper impact on the actual 
poverty risk of the Spanish elderly population than one that might be observed in 
other European Union countries, in which savings in the form of real and financial 
assets are distributed differently.  
 
                                                        
1 In the case of Spain, in which widow pensions account for 26.58% of the total number of pensions paid 
by social security (in absolute terms 2,273,470 pensions in the year 2009), the most detailed analysis of 
this benefit can be found in Namkee Ahn and Florentino Felgueroso (2007).  
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This article is organised as follows. In Section 2, we offer some methodologi-
cal considerations about the indicator that was chosen to measure the financial wel-
fare of widow pensioners. In Section 3, we explain the methodology and data used. 
Section 4 presents the results, and, finally, we discuss the most relevant conclusions.  
 
1. Measuring the Welfare of Widow Pensioners 
 
The income flow of an individual is, on the one hand, the sum of the monetary in-
come stemming from economic activity (in our case the income flow provided by 
the pension system), and, on the other hand, the income (if it exists) stemming from 
the decumulation of savings and/or such profitability of savings. A person’s risk of 
entering a situation of relative poverty (Herman Deeleck, Karel Van den Bosh, and 
Lieve De Lathouvewer 1992) depends on two factors. It can depend on the poverty 
line selected, or it can depend on the total amount of income drawn compared to 
such a poverty line, that is to say, whether the sum of the total income is higher or 
lower than the poverty line selected. 
To evaluate the effect of the reform of the pension system on the welfare of 
widow pensioners we will compute the poverty risk that would result if income from 
social security were the sole source of income for the pensioners. That is to say, the 
poverty risk that stems from the used of income of social security. The variation in 
the risk of poverty presented here cannot be related to the real risk of poverty given 
that this paper cannot take into consideration the wealth held by individuals. The 
wealth variable, which is necessary to compute the poverty rate of individuals, is not 
included in this analysis because pertinent information is not available. Spain does 
have information about the wealth of households (Spanish Survey of Household Fi-
nance EFF 2005), which includes that of households composed of pensioners. How-
ever, this information cannot be matched to our dataset. 
Consequently, the poverty rate is only used as an instrument to measure the 
gains or losses that stem from the reform.  
Taking these considerations about the nature of our indicator of poverty risk 
into account, we use the standard poverty threshold proposed by the European Un-
ion, which is 60 per cent of the median equivalised income
2.  
 
2. Spain’s Pension System and Reform Proposal 
 
2.1 Widow Pension Benefit 
 
Widows in Spain are entitled to a benefit that is related to the pension of their hus-
bands. Precisely for this reason, it is classified within the group of derived pension 
                                                        
2 Eurostat. 2009. Statistics. 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/income_social_inclusion_living_conditions/data/datab
ase (accessed September, 2009). 
The poverty threshold is defined as 60 per cent of the Equivalised Median Income for households com-
prising one single person between 1995 and 2007 (Eurostat 2009). For the period 1986-1994, the poverty 
line is defined as the 60 per cent of the Equivalised Mean Income estimated by Mercedes Prieto and 
Carmelo García (2007). Consequently, poverty threshold changes every single year according to income 
changes.  
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benefits, which may be drawn only after the husband’s death. More concretely, ex-
pression (1) describes the pension i drawn by the widow in year t. Under the current 
law, a widow’s pension can be calculated by applying a coefficient  equal to 52 
per cent of the regulatory base of her husband. This result constitutes the Effective 
Pension of the widow, which forms the basis for the computation of the final benefit 
to which the widow is entitled.  
 
it i it assessment se gulatoryBa on WidowPensi Re Re     (1)
 
The regulatory base constitutes the basis for the computation of the husband’s 
retirement pension. The husband’s contributions to the social security system during 
his working life are analysed and then used to compute the benefit to which each 
individual, according to the regulation, is entitled. Let TAEt denote the Taxable Av-
erage Earnings of the husband in period t, where each period is measured as a 
month. Then the regulatory base of the husband is computed as the weighted sum of 
the last 180 months of Taxable Average Earnings, or, in other words, the Taxable 
Average Earnings of the last 15 years of contributions. The last 24 months of contri-
butions to the system are weighted as 1, that is, they are computed by their nominal 
value. The months prior to these last 24 months (months 25 to 180) are weighted 
according to an index that is intended to take into account the price evolution that 
has been registered for a given period of time. Concretely, these previous earnings 
are adjusted by means of the coefficient between the price level in the 25
th month 
and the price level in the respective month t. The price level in the economy is 
measured according to the Consumer Price Index (CPIt). Finally, the result is di-
vided by 210 in order to obtain the value of the regulatory base to which the pen-
sioner (husband) is entitled. Expression (2) shows the exact formula used to com-
pute the regulatory base (RB) of the pension.  
 
210
24
1
180
25
25 



tt t
t i CPI
CPI
TAE TAE
RB   (2)
 
The pensioner will then draw his pension, more or less proportionately, as de-
termined by this regulatory base and depending on the years of contribution to the 
system. After 15 years of contributions, the initial pension is equal to 50 per cent of 
the regulatory base. Each additional year of contribution increases the percentage of 
the regulatory base between 2 and 3 per cent. The total amount of the regulatory 
base is drawn only by those individuals who have contributed for at least 35 years. 
This percentage, however, is not taken into account for the computed widow benefit. 
In the case of the widow pension, as mentioned above, the percentage to which the 
wife is entitled by law is 52 per cent of the regulatory base to which the husband is 
entitled. This is true even if the husband were entitled to the whole regulatory base 
because he had contributed for 35 years or even if he were only entitled to 50 per 
cent of the regulatory base because he had only contributed for 15 years. As a con- 
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sequence, the effective pension to which the widow is entitled is 52 per cent of the 
regulatory base of her husband. 
Additionally, the widow pension is adjusted according to the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI), also known as the reassessment of the pension. In the case of a widow 
pension, the reassessment may be described as having two different components. 
First, the effective pension is initially revised through an accounting of the evolution 
of the consumer price index dating from the year in which the husband started to 
draw his retirement pension until the year in which he died; consequently, the 
widow acquires the right to draw the benefit of the widow pension. The sum of the 
effective pension plus this amount of reassessment constitutes the initial pension to 
which the widow is entitled. The widow draws this initial pension during the first 
year of widowhood. In subsequent years, the widow pension benefit is adjusted ac-
cording to the annual evolution of the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Reassessment 
then increases each year as a result of the indexation of the pension benefit to the 
Consumer Price Index for that year. 
In sum, as shown in expression (1), the widow pension, drawn by widow i in 
the year t, is the result of addition of the amount of reassessmentit to the effective 
pension to which the widow is entitled, that is, the result of applying the 52 per cent 
coefficient to the corresponding regulatory base. 
A widow pension, like the rest of pensions within the system, is comple-
mented with other benefits of a means-tested nature (basically the minimum com-
plements), which are not taken into account in this study. These complementary 
benefits are discretional. Every year, the government defines the minimum poverty 
threshold, which takes into account both personal and household characteristics of 
the pensioner. It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine the effect of these 
complementary benefits, so they have not been included in the estimates. In any case, 
the inclusion of these complementary benefits would not alter the estimated results 
given that the minimum complement remains below the poverty threshold and thus 
does not eradicate poverty among these pensioners. 
 
2.2 Reform Proposal 
 
The reform that the Spanish parliament passed in the summer of 2011 proposes 
various plans of action. In this paper we will discuss only those strategies that have 
a direct impact on widow pensions. On one hand, we refer to the new parameters 
that will be used to compute the regulatory base. Once the reform is fully imple-
mented (which is slated for the middle of the next decade), the number of years to 
be included in the computation of the regulatory base will increase from the current 
15 to 25. This increase implies a reduction in the regulatory base of about 10 per-
cent; that is to say, 1 percentage point for each year (Rafael Muñoz de Bustillo et al. 
2007). The reform also includes a modification of the coefficient applied to the 
regulatory base. This coefficient will increase from the current 52 per cent to 60 per 
cent. Additionally, this second measure does not envision a long gestation period 
before it is put in practise because the law will be applied beginning January 1, 
2012. The first of the measures, cited above, will, ceteris paribus, reduce the widow 
pension, but the second measure will have the opposite effect.  
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Our aim is to quantify the combined effect of these two measures. We sought 
to answer the following question: is the change in the computational method of the 
regulatory base compensated for by the increase in the coefficient applied to it when 
a widow pension benefit is computed? If this question can be affirmed, then the re-
form would be considered neutral or even positive for the welfare of future recipi-
ents of widow pensions. As a consequence, the reform would have no effect on the 
pensioners; it might even help diminish their risk of future poverty. 
 
3. Data and Methodology  
 
3.1 Data Source 
 
The source of data is the Spanish Continuous Survey of Working Lives (MCVL), 
which conducts an annual survey for the Spanish Ministry of Immigration and So-
cial Security.  
These data, which have been collected annually since 2004, provide informa-
tion about the working lives of 1,170,000 pensioners and employed workers
3. Our 
analysis has been carried out using the information of the standard widow pension 
from the year 2007. The standard holder of a widow pension is defined as the pen-
sioner who draws a single pension and does not draw any other complementary bene-
fit. 
The entire path of pension benefits has been reconstructed for each pensioner 
in the data according to the pension formula
4 used by the Spanish Social Security 
System up to the year in which the pensioner entered the system. As a consequence, 
the study has been undertaken with an unbalanced panel dataset, which starts in the 
year 1986 and concludes in the year 2007. Each widow enters the panel in the year 
when her corresponding pension is acknowledged and continues until the end of the 
period, which is the year 2007. After the database was debugged, the total number 
of individuals included in the study was 28,386. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
The employed method is the dynamic duration analysis based on the estimates pro-
posed by Edward Kaplan and Paul Meier (1958). Applying this method, one can 
follow the evolution of the pensioner’s welfare over time from the moment she 
starts drawing the pension. Dynamic duration analysis is the most appropriate 
method for studying pensions such as this one in the Spanish system, in which the 
pension benefit is adjusted according to the evolution of a given price index but not 
                                                        
3 The Spanish social security system comprises the General Social Security Scheme, with which salaried 
workers as a whole are affiliated (71% of the total number of those affiliated), and a Special Self-
employed Workers Scheme, with which the self-employed are affiliated (15% of the total number of 
those affiliated). The rest of the system comprises several minor groups, such as fishermen or mine 
workers. This study is focused exclusively on pensioners who are part of the General Social Security 
Scheme. 
4 The reassessment, corresponding to the period of time from when the retiree starts receiving the pension 
to the moment the widow starts drawing, it has been assumed to be fifty percent of the effective pension, 
as shown by the estimates used in the data.  
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of a productivity index. The effect is known in the research literature as the “ageing 
process of the pension benefit” (Peinado and Serrano 2012). 
  
The cumulative probability of a poor widow pension (cumulative risk of pov-
erty) in period t is given by one minus the value of the survivor function (Tony Lan-
caster 1990) in the moment t, and the survivor function is written as follows in ex-
pression 3: 
 
  
M m
N
E N
a S
m
r r
r r
m
,..., 1
ˆ
1






 


  (3)
 
where  ) ( ˆ
m a S  is the estimate of the probability not to be poor in the moment m, 
where Nr is the number of individuals who remain in the sample in the moment r 
(because they have not been counted or because they have not entered a poverty 
situation), and where Er is the number of people who precisely in the moment r fall 
below the poverty line. M is the maximum number of periods analysed, which is 22 
in this study.  
The Poverty Effect of the Reform (PERm) is measured as the difference in the 
cumulative risk of poverty before and after the reform for each period m. In other 
words, it is the difference between the cumulative risk of poverty as shown in ex-
pression 4 where in each period m the probability of not being poor before the im-
plementation of the reform is identified by      m a S0 ˆ  and the probability of not being 
poor after the reform k by      m k a S ˆ : 
    
M m
a S a S PER m m k
k
m
,..., 1
ˆ 1 ˆ 1 0

      (4)
 
The estimates are presented in four scenarios. The first scenario (Baseline) 
presents the situation before the implementation of the reform. It shows the cumula-
tive poverty risk faced by widow pensioners before the reform is implemented. The 
second scenario (10% Regulatory Base) quantifies the effect on the cumulative pov-
erty risk analysed in the previous step of the reform, which consists of an increase of 
the period used to compute the regulatory base from the last 15 to the last 25 years. 
The third scenario (60% Coefficient) quantifies the effect of the reform when it con-
sists of an increase in the applied coefficient from the current 52 to 60 per cent. The 
last scenario (Total Reform) analyses the effect of the reform when both policy 
measures are implemented at the same time, that is, both an increase in the number 
of years used to compute the regulatory base from the last 15 to the last 25 and an 
increase in the coefficient applied to the regulatory base from 52 to 60 per cent. 
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4. Results 
 
4.1 The Current Welfare of Spanish Widow Pensioners 
 
Figure 1 shows the estimates of the evolution of the cumulative poverty risk faced 
by Spanish widow pensioners before the implementation of any of part of the re-
form; that is to say, it presents the current situation or baseline scenario. As can be 
observed, in the year in which the pension is first paid out, the poverty risk is about 
41.5 per cent. The risk shows an upward trend, that is, it continues to rise over time. 
As the estimates of the function show, 51.2 per cent of the beneficiaries of a widow 
pension fall below the poverty line 8 years after they start receiving the pension. In 
other words, the evolution of the function shows that 51.2 per cent of the women 
who have just entered the system will stand below the poverty line 8 years after first 
drawing their pension. For example, a pensioner who becomes a widow in the year 
2004 and starts drawing her pension in 2004 is expected to fall below the poverty 
line before the year 2013 with a probability of 51.2 per cent. This cumulative pov-
erty risk rises to 63.7 per cent for a pensioner of 16 years and to 65.4 per cent for 
those who have been drawing their pension for 19 or more years. Thus, the overall 
financial welfare of the widow pensioner decreases over time as a consequence of 
the ageing process of the pension she draws. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates.
 
Figure 1  Baseline: Estimates of the Evolution of the Cumulative Risk of Poverty before 
the Implementation of any Reform Proposal 
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4.2 The Effect of Changes in the Regulatory Base 
 
Figure 2 shows the effect on widow pensioners of a reform that includes a change in 
the regulatory base of the individual who implements the pension. Based on Figure 
2, several conclusions may be drawn. First, the shape of the function representing 
the cumulative risk of poverty is similar to the one observed before the implementa-
tion of the reform: it increases during the initial periods and then slows down during 
the last years that the pension is drawn. Second, the reform increases the cumulative 
risk of poverty for the whole life of the pension. Poverty risk in the initial period 
increases from 41.5 per cent to 46.6 per cent and from 65.4 per cent to 73.3 per cent 
in the final period. Third, Figure 2 shows a divergence from the previous trend. The 
change in the regulatory base causes the cumulative poverty risk to rise from 5.1 
percentage points higher than it was for the initial period before the implementation 
of the reform to 7.9 percentage points higher in the final period. As a consequence, 
the reverse effects of the reform are shown to be more harmful over time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates.
 
Figure 2   Effect of a 10 per cent Decrease of the Regulatory Base 
 
 
4.3 The Effect of the Change in Coefficient 
 
A reform that increases the coefficient applied to the regulatory base of the individ-
ual who implements the widow pension would, as may be concluded from Figure 3, 
decrease the cumulative risk of poverty for the whole life of the pensioner in con-
trast to the risk that was faced when no reform was implemented. This is why the 
new function (60% Coefficient) is situated below the baseline function. The shape 
of the graph, as shown in Figure 3, is very similar to that of the baseline, as the in-
crease in the cumulative risk of poverty is greater at the beginning of the period and 
less at the end. It starts at 35 per cent and ultimately reaches 57 per cent. This evolu- 
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tion implies an initial decrease of the cumulative poverty risk equal to 6.5 per cent, 
which then increases to 8.3 per cent (Poverty Effect of the Reform). As a conse-
quence, there is a divergence between the cumulative poverty risks faced before 
(baseline) and after (60% coefficient) the implementation of the reform, although in 
this scenario the divergence is smaller than the one registered for the previous case, 
which entailed a diminution of the regulatory base. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates.
 
Figure 3  Effect of a Change in the Coefficient Applied to Regulatory Base 
 
 
4.4 The Final Effect of Total Reform 
 
Figure 4 compares the final effect of the implementation of the total reform (Total 
Reform) with the initial situation (baseline). When both the regulatory base of the 
individual who implements the widow pension diminishes by 10 per cent and the 
applied coefficient to it changes from 52 per cent to 60 per cent, the final cumulative 
poverty risk of the widow pensioners decreases for the whole life of the widow, as 
shown in the “Total reform” function, which can be seen below that of the “Base-
line”. In this case, where the functions seem to be similar, the divergence between 
them is even lower over time. The cumulative poverty risk of the Total Reform at 
the beginning of the period is about 39.7 per cent. This risk increases through the 
final periods when it reaches 63.2 per cent. Thus, as the Poverty Effect of the Re-
form demonstrates, the cumulative poverty risk decreases with respect to the base-
line by some 1.8 to 2.2 per cent.  
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Source: Authors’ estimates.
 
Figure 4  Effect of the Total Reform 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper demonstrates the dynamic effect that the reform of the social security 
pension system has on the overall financial welfare of one of the most vulnerable 
groups in the population: the recipients of widow pensions. It has been shown that 
the widow pensioners’ level of financial welfare diminishes over time. While a re-
form that would only entail a longer contribution history to compute the pension 
benefit would increase the cumulative poverty risk between 5 (initial period) and 8 
(final period) per cent, an increase in the coefficient applied to such a regulatory 
base from 52 per cent to 60 per cent would bring the most positive effects, that is, a 
decrease in the cumulative poverty risk of between 6.2 (initial period) and 8.3 (final 
period) per cent compared to the current situation. The combination of the two 
measures would ultimately have a positive effect on the welfare of the widow pen-
sioners as it would reduce their cumulative risk of poverty by 1.8 (initial period) and 
2.2 (final period) per cent. These results make clear the difference between the cu-
mulative poverty risks registered at the beginning and at the end of the period; in 
other words, the reforms would have a stronger effect on the pensioners as they 
draw the benefit over a longer period of time. 
The results indicate that the intended reform of the social security pension sys-
tem could prevent one group of pensioners from sinking deeper into poverty. These 
results, however, should not minimise the fact that the poverty risk of the widow 
pensioners continues to remain high. In any case, before any new proposals to correct 
this level of poverty are undertaken, it would be advisable to supplement these results 
with other studies that would also include an analysis of the wealth variable. This is 
the only way to ensure that we have a precise idea of the real situation (real poverty 
risk) in which this group of pensioners might finally find themselves. As has been  
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frequently noted in this paper, it is not possible at this time to compare the datasets 
that contain the appropriate wealth information to the dataset here used, which can 
only provide income information from social security. 
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